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Abstract 
We model a monopolist who offers a product and a complementary service, where only the latter 
exhibits positive network externalities. We focus on the online game industry as a representative 
case in which the product (the game), unlike the service (access to the interactive online play 
mode), has zero marginal cost, and consider two-potential pricing strategies: 1) the bundle 
pricing, in which the vendor charges a single price for the product and the service; and 2) the 
separate pricing, in which the vendor sets the prices of the product and the service separately. We 
find that, in contrast to the common result in the bundling literature, bundling may increase 
consumer surplus, while the monopolist chooses not to offer the bundle. We offer theoretical 
evidence that this is due to the presence of network externalities. 
Keywords:  Bundling, price discrimination, network externalities, online game industry 
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Résumé 
Dans cette recherche, nous modélisons un monopoleur qui offre un produit et un service complémentaire, où seul ce 
dernier possède des externalités de réseau positives. Nous constatons que, contrairement au résultat commun dans 
la littérature, le lot de produit peut augmenter le surplus du consommateur, alors que le monopoleur choisit de ne 
pas offrir le lot. Nous prouvons de façon théorique que c'est du à la présence des externalités de réseau. 
Abstract in Korean 
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Introduction 
In many industries, a firm may offer complementary service along with its base product in order to enhance the 
value created to its customers. For example, Windows OS customers are offered periodic software upgrades; virus 
protection software vendors such as Symantec Corporation or McAfee Inc. provide their customers with periodic 
security updates to protect them from newly-found computer viruses or security breaches. Enterprise system 
software such as SAP R/3 or Oracle ERP is often sold with a variety of service options such as implementation, 
consulting, training, and technical support. Thus, it is important for firms to correctly decide which services to 
provide and set the price of the service and product to maximize profit  
In this study, we develop an economic model of an industry in which firms provide complementary online services 
to customers who purchase a base product.. Focusing on services with positive network externalities, so that the 
value of the service to its users increases with the number of customers that subscribe to the service, we analyze the 
firm’s decision on the provision and pricing of the online service. Our research is motivated by the observation that 
in some cases, network externalities arise not from the consumption of the base product, but from using the service 
complementary to the base product, while most models in the literature assume that network externalities arise from 
the base product. One exemplary industry is the online game industry, a big industry which was estimated at $3.4 
billion in 2005 and is expected to grow up to $11 billion in 20111.  
We assume heterogonous consumers, and consider the following two pricing strategies; 1) the bundle pricing 
strategy, where the vendor charges a single price for the base product and the service; and 2) the separate pricing 
strategy, where the vendor sets the price of the base product and the service separately, and a user who wants to get 
the service has to pay an additional service fee. With this specification, we address the following research questions. 
(i) Under what conditions the firm chooses the bundle pricing or the separate pricing? 
(ii) How does the firm’s bundling decision affect social welfare? 
We find that the firm’s pricing choice depends on the marginal cost of the service as well as its intrinsic value to 
customers. We also show that the service may be supplied less than is social optimum. Especially, we find that while 
bundling might be preferred by consumers and maximizes social surplus, the monopoly chooses to sell the service 
separately. Further analysis suggests that the service is often under-provided because of the existence of network 
externalities; the vendor cannot fully capture the benefits generated for consumers from the service with network 
externalities. 
 
Literature Review 
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Our work is related to the literature on network externalities and bundling. Network externalities arise when the 
utility that a user derives from a product increases with the number of other consumers that use the same or 
compatible product (Katz and Shapiro 1985). Therefore, a customer's utility from the product is a function of the 
product's inherent value and the total number of customers (Ellison and Fudenberg 2000).  
A number of studies examine the effect and implications of network externalities on competition, market equilibrium, 
and social welfare under a variety of circumstances. Topics studied include the pricing of network goods, the 
achievement of compatibility and standardization between multiple competing goods (Katz and Shapiro 1985; 
Farrell and Saloner 1986; Lee and Mendelson 2007), and the upgrade and intertemporal compatibility decision 
(Choi 1994, Ellison and Fudenberg 2000). Cabral et al. (1999) provide an economic justification for introductory 
pricing in the presence of network externalities; they show that a monopolist can charge a low price in early periods 
to attract a sufficient number of customers and take advantage of this customer base in the following periods by 
charging higher prices. Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) find that, at the presence of network externalities, a large 
customer base that an incumbent builds with introductory pricing can deter entry of competitors and the 
monopolist’s competitive position can be sustained. Jing (2007) shows that a seller of information goods benefits 
from second degree price discrimination when network externalities exist, while price discrimination is not optimal 
when there are no network externalities. Our work examines pricing and bundling decisions in the presence of 
network externalities.   
The literature generally shows that bundling enables the seller to capture more value from consumers and thus 
reduces consumers’ surplus (Adams and Yellen 1976, Schmalensee 1984). Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) show that 
by bundling a large number of information goods a monopolist can capture most of the consumer surplus because 
the bundling reduces the variance in consumers' valuations and makes the demand more elastic. Their following 
study (Bakos and Brynjolfsson 2000) considers production costs as well as distribution costs (incurred by the 
vendor); they show that the two components of costs play a key role in the monopolist’s decision whether to bundle 
or unbundle information goods. The distribution cost in Bakos and Brynjolfsson (2000) is similar to the marginal 
cost of service in our model (as both costs are increasing in the number of customers). Parker and Van Alstyne 
(2000) consider bundling in a model of a two-sided market with network effects (Parker and Van Alstyne 2005). 
When a vendor sells two components, one to each side of the market, he might find bundling of the two components 
optimal when at least one side of the market is interested in both components and the valuations for the lease valued 
component are high enough.  
Our model differs from previous models in the bundling literature in that one of the bundle’s components, the base 
game, has no marginal cost while the other component, i.e. the service, involves both a positive marginal cost and 
demand-side network externalities. In addition, the components of the bundle are not symmetric, as the service has 
no standalone value, while the game does. 
 
The Model 
We consider a market with N customers who are heterogeneous in terms of their valuations for the product and for 
the service. We assume that the valuation for the base product, θ, is uniformly distributed in [ ,θ θ ], where 0θ >  
and 0θ ≤ . A consumer’s valuation for the service is given by ( )ess nα + , where esn  is the total expected number of 
customers who subscribe to the service, and s is the intrinsic value of the service independent on the number of 
service users. In our analysis, we find the fulfilled expectations equilibrium, that is we find prices (for product and 
service) such that *sn , the actual number of service customers, equals esn  (Katz and Shapiro 1985).  
The heterogeneity in the valuation for the service is modeled as follows. To simplify the analysis, we divide 
customers into two groups: βN customers (Group 1) have 1α α= , while the remaining (1 )Nβ−  customers (Group 
2) have 2α α= . We assume that 0 1β< <  and 1 2 0α α> ≥ , so that the utility of Group 1 customers is affected by 
the network size to a greater extent. We assume that the vendor cannot identify a customer’s valuation for the base 
product and the service. The vendor has three pricing options as follows2.  
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 Since the complementary service is available only to the base product customers and has no standalone value, a mixed bundling 
strategy, in which a vendor sells two products independently as well as the bundle, is not viable.  
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Case 0: Selling the Product Only 
First, we consider the case in which the monopoly offers only the product. The utility function of Group 1 and 2 
customers is given in Eq. 1. 
021 puu −== θ        (Eq. 1) 
p0 is the price for the product. The profit function of the monopoly in this case is given by 
000 pn=π .       (Eq. 2) 
where n0 is the number of customers who purchase the product. The marginal cost of the base product is zero. 
 
Case 1: The Bundle Pricing 
Choosing this option, the vendor sells a bundle of the base product and the subscription to the service with a single 
price p1. The expected utility functions of customers from Group 1 and 2 are given in Equations 3 and 4, respectively. 
1 1 1( )esu s n pθ α= + + −  (Eq. 3)  2 2 1( )esu s n pθ α= + + −  (Eq. 4) 
The first terms in Eqs. 3 and 4 represent the customer’s utility from the product; the second terms in Eq. 3 and Eq. 4 
are the utility from using the complementary service. Only customers whose overall utility is nonnegative purchase 
the bundle. The profit function of the monopolist when selling the bundle is given by 
*
1 1( )sn p cπ = − .       (Eq. 5) 
*
sn  is the actual number of customers who purchase the bundle. We assume that while the marginal cost for the base 
product is zero, the marginal cost to serve one service subscriber is c.3  
 
Case 2: The Separate Pricing  
In this pricing, the vendor charges service users a service subscription fee f. This results in a situation that only 
Group 1 customers, who have higher valuation for the service, subscribe to the service, while Group 2 customers do 
not subscribe to the service but purchase the base product only. Therefore, the vendor can use this pricing strategy as 
a means for price discrimination. The utility functions of a customer from Group 1 and Group 2 are as follows. 
1 1 2( )esu s n p fθ α= + + − −  (Eq. 6)  22 pu −= θ   (Eq. 7) 
u1 is the utility function of customers in Group 1, while u2 is the utility of customers in Group 2.. p2 and f are the 
price of the product and the service subscription fee, respectively, and both are determined by the vendor. The profit 
function of the monopoly under this option is given by 
*
2 2 0 ( )sp n n f cπ = + − ,      (Eq. 8) 
where n0 is the total number of customers that purchase the product (from both groups) and *sn  is the number of 
Group 1 customers that purchase the product (and thus subscribe to the service).  
  
Results 
Before embarking the analysis, we make a parameter assumption as follows. This assumption guarantees the second-
order condition to hold for all the following derivations. 
Assumption 1. ( )21 )1( αββαθθ −+>− N , where 0 1 2(1 )α βα β α= + −  
We derived optimal prices and resulting profits under each of the above three cases, using the concept of Fulfilled 
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so forth) to serve a larger number of users. 
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Expectations Equilibrium (Katz and Shapiro 1985), and then compared the profit functions in order to determine the 
profit maximizing strategy – bundling of product and service, separate pricing or selling only product.  The 
monopolist’s pricing choice is summarized in Lemma 1. 
Lemma 1. (The Monopoly’s Pricing Strategy). We denote θ θ∆ = −  and ( )
( )
1 0
0
1 2 (1 )
N N
s
θ α β α
α α β
∆ − − ∆ −
=
− − ∆
. The 
monopoly chooses its pricing strategy as follows 
When 0s s≤  holds 
i) The vendor chooses the bundle pricing iff 10c c<  and does not operate the service otherwise, where   
( )10 0 01c N sθ α α= − ∆ − ∆ + . 
When 0s s>  holds, 
ii) The vendor chooses the bundle pricing, if and only if 12c c< , where 
( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( )( )
222
1 0 1 2 1 2
2
12
1 2 1 2
N N s N
s
c
N N
α β α β α α θ β α α
α
θ
β α α β α α
∆ − ∆ − ∆ − + ∆ − −
∆
= − +
∆ − − ∆ ∆ − −
. 
iii) The vendor chooses the separate pricing, if and only if 12 20c c c< < , where 
     ( )20 1 11c N sθ α β α= − ∆ − ∆ + . 
iv) The vendor does not operate the service at all, if and only if 20c c> . 
 
c
c
The Bundle Pricing
(Case 1)
c10
No Service
Offered (Case 0)
c12 c20
The Bundle Pricing
(Case 1)
The Separate Pricing
(Case 2)
No Service
Offered (Case 0)
0
0
0s s>When
0s s<When
 
Figure 1. The Vendor’s Offering Choice 
 
Figure 1 describes the vendor’s strategy choice according to Lemma 1. If 0s s≤  then the monopoly never finds it 
optimal to sell the service separately. In addition he offers the bundle only when the cost, c, is low enough (lower 
than a threshold value given by c10).  
If 0s s>  then when the marginal cost of offering the service is lower than a threshold value given by c12, it is 
optimal for the vendor to charge customers a single-price for the product and its complementary service. On the 
other hand, when the marginal cost is between c12 and c20, the monopolist chooses the separate pricing. When the 
marginal cost is higher than c20, the service is not offered at all by the monopolist.  
The above finding that the separate pricing is more likely to prevail when the marginal cost of the service is higher is 
consistent with a real-life example. According to recent surveys, users of Starcraft, Warcraft III, and Diablo II, 
online real-time strategy games produced by Blizzard Entertainment, spend 10.5 minutes a day on average in 
Battle.net, Blizzard’s online gaming system; all three games are sold with the bundle pricing (Case 1). On the other 
hand, the average playing-time per day of a user of World of Warcraft, which is also developed by Blizzard, is 1.46 
hours. This shows that Blizzard has to incur a higher cost in online systems to serve a World of Warcraft player than 
to serve a player of Starcraft, Warcraft III, or Diablio II. Indeed, World of Warcraft is sold by using the separate 
pricing strategy (Case 2).  
Economics of Information Systems 
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How does the monopolist’s pricing decision affect social welfare? Before presenting a detailed analysis, we provide 
a numerical example in Figure 2, which reveals that the service may be supplied less than social optimum. 
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Figure 2. The Vendor’s Choice and Social Optimum 
 
Region Monopoly’s Choice Social Optimum  
1 No Service No Service  
2 The Separate Pricing The Bundle Pricing Under-provision 
3 The Bundle Pricing The Bundle Pricing  
4 No Service The Bundle Pricing Under-provision 
5 No Service The Separate Pricing Under-provision 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the profit maximizing choice and the one that maximizes social welfare over the range of the 
marginal cost (c) and the intrinsic value of the service (s). Notice that s0 from Lemma 1 corresponds to the value of s 
at point b in Figure 1. In addition, the lines a-b, b-c, and b-d in Figure 1 correspond to the thresholds c10, c12, and c20 
in Lemma 1, respectively. Figure 2 demonstrates three cases in which the service is under-supplied compared to 
what is socially optimum: in Region 2, bundling maximizes social welfare but the monopoly chooses separate 
pricing, and in Regions 4 and 5 them monopoly does not offer the service although this is not socially optimal. 
Most of the bundling literature shows that bundling enables the monopoly seller to extract greater surplus from the 
consumers (Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1999). In contrast to previous models, Dewan and Freimer (2003) show that a 
software vendor might choose to sell add-in software separately from the base software, even though consumers 
prefer a bundle of the two (this paper does not examine the total surplus). Our findings of Region 2 in Figure 1, in 
which a bundle is socially optimal but the monopolist sells the service separately (which implies that consumers 
surplus is maximized with a bundle), is similar to the main finding from Dewan and Freimer (2003).  
In Proposition 1, we compare the optimal seller’s strategy with the strategy that is socially optimal for the case in 
which consumers are homogenous with respect to their service valuation (i.e. the case in which 1 2α α= , or 
alternatively 1β = ). Notice that when 1β = , the seller has no incentive to adopt the separate pricing strategy; he 
either sells a bundle, or does not offer the service at all.  
Proposition 1. (The Vendor’s Pricing Strategy and Social Welfare) When 1β = , the vendor provides the service less 
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than social optimum when 10 0Sc c c< < , where 
( )
( )
1
0 1
1
2
1
2
S
N
c s
N
α
θ α
α
 ∆ − ∆ + = − +
 ∆ ∆ ∆ + − 
.  
c
c100 cS0
The Bundle Pricing
(Case 1)
No Service
Offered
Provision of the service
is socially optimal.
Provision of the service
is not socially optimal.
Under-provision
of the Service
 
Figure 3. The Under-Provision of the Service when the Service Exhibits Network Externalities 
 
Figure 3 demonstrated the results of Proposition 1; when consumers have homogenous valuation for the service, 
there exists a range of c values (between c10, and cS0) for which the monopoly chooses not to offer the service, 
although offering the service would maximize social welfare.   
In what follows we give additional insight as to why the service may be supplied less than is socially optimum at the 
presence of network externalities. Our main argument is that the monopoly can not capture all of the benefits 
generated for consumers by the network effects, and thus the vendor may choose not to operate the service even 
though this is not socially optimal.  
We first analyze an alternative model in which the complementary service does not involve network externalities. 
Suppose the utility from the service is denoted by 1sα  and does not depend upon the number of service 
subscribers4. Then it can be shown that the vendor offers the service with a price of 1( ) / 2s cα +  only when 
1c sα< , a decision which maximizes social welfare. Thus, when the service does not create network effects, there is 
no under-provision of service. However, when the service does have network externalities, the service may be 
under-provided in the market.  
The next proposition gives additional insight as to why the service may be supplied less than is socially optimum at 
the presence of network externalities. 
Proposition 2. Consumer surplus increases in the degree of network externalities to a greater extent than the 
monopolist’s profit does. More specifically, When 1β = , c θ< , and 2θ θ− > , 1 1
1 1
CS π
α α
∂ ∂
>
∂ ∂
. As a result, 
Social welfare increases to a greater extent than the profit, as well. 
Suppose that a progress in information technologies increases the degree of network externalities (α1) by offering a 
greater level of interactivity between game players. Proposition 2 states that an increase in the degree of network 
externalities affects consumer surplus to a greater extent than it affects the vendor’s profit. An increase in α1 makes it 
possible for the vendor to charge a higher price for the bundle. By raising the price of the bundle, however, the 
vendor may lose marginal customers who have low valuation for the base product. Thus, the vendor cannot raise its 
price to an extent that will let him capture a significant portion of consumer welfare generated by the greater degree 
of network externalities.  
Another reason for the under-provision of the service is the fact that the service does not have standalone value; it 
can be sold only to customers who also buy the product. For a comparison, suppose that the service can be sold 
independently even to those who do not buy the base product. In such a case, the monopolists charges 1( )s Nα +  
for the service as long as this is equal to or greater than c, and customers expect that all the customers subscribe to 
the service. In this case, the monopolist can capture the entire consumer surplus generated from the service, while it 
cannot when the service has no value without the base product as in our setting. 
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 The utility from the base product and the service becomes 1 1u s pθ α= + − . 
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Conclusion 
We model a monopolist which sells a product and its complementary service, where the latter exhibits network 
externalities. Our motivation is based on our observation that, for some products, network externalities arise from a 
complementary service and not from the product itself. One industry to which our model applies is the computer 
games industry – where online services are available to those who buy packaged games. In our model, the vendor 
can either operate the service or not, and if it chooses to offer the service, it can either bundle it with the product, 
offering the bundle for a single price, or offer the service with a separate service subscription fee.  
We derive the conditions under which each pricing strategy becomes the vendor’s optimal choice. We find that the 
pricing choice depends upon the marginal cost of the service as well as the intrinsic value of the service. Under the 
presence of network externalities, we find that the vendor may provide the bundle less than social optimum. This 
finding is in contrast to general contentions in the bundling literature that the bundling is a tool to capture a greater 
amount of consumer surplus. But it is consistent with several recent papers such as Dewan and Freimer (2003), 
which show that a bundle is provided less than social optimum. 
There are numerous ways to extend our study. First, it would be interesting to consider a duopoly where each firm 
might either bundle the service with the product or sell it separately, and examine whether under provision of service 
still prevails. Second, the case in which customers use the service for multiple periods by paying periodic service 
fees can be considered. Lastly, it would be interesting to examine how price discrimination (by identifying 
customers associations to the two groups) can effect the under provision of service than social welfare. In case of 
World of Warcraft, for example, subscribers in the U.S. pay a monthly fee of $19.99, while those in Europe pay 
12.99 euro. Interestingly, Chinese subscribers have to pay about $3.72 per 60 hours.  
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